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The Life and Times of Boyd v. United States (1886-1976)
In Boyd v. United States,1 the Supreme Court held that the
fourth 2 and fifth 3 amendments create a zone of privacy encompassing
an individual's person and property. 4 The government, according to
Boyd,5 cannot enter this zone, either by compelling an individual
to testify against himself or by subpoenaing or seizing his books
and papers for use as evidence against hiin in a criminal or quasicriminal0 proceeding. The Court found an "intimate relation" 7
between the two amendments such that the search and seizure of
books and papers may be "unreasonable" even if conducted pursuant
to a court order.
Over time, both societal and judicial notions of property and privacy have changed dramatically. In addition, varying public reactions to the proble~ of crime in the United States have been
paralleled by shifting judicial views on the limitations on the government's constitutional power to apprehend and prosecute criminal suspects. These trends have been reflected in the gradual erosion of
the "intimate relation" doctrine and the elimination of the protection
that Boyd afforded to individual liberty. During the October Term,
1975, the Supreme Court accelerated this process when it all but
overruled that landmark decision. This Note will trace these trends
and examine the demise of Boyd.

I. THE PROTECTIONIST ERA: Boyd AND Gouled
Boyd and Gouled v. United States8 combined to build a nearly
impenetrable barrier between the government and an individual's
property. In Boyd, a forfeiture proceeding under the customs revenue law, the United States claimed that Boyd and Sons, a partner!. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
2. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef•
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War•
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
3. "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself . • . ."
4. See text at notes 22-24 infra.
5. The Boyd holding became applicable to the states as a result of Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961), and Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
6. A quasi-criminal proceeding is an action, like the forfeiture proceeding involved in Boyd, whose "object . . . is to penalize for the commission of an offense
against the law." One 1958 · Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700
(1965). Henceforth, this Note will not distinguish between criminal and quasi-criminal proceedings unless the context so requires.
7. 116 U.S. at 633.
8. 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
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ship, had fraudulently evaded paying taxes on thirty-five cartons of
imported plate glass. The statutory penalty for fraudulent nonpayment of the tariff was the forfeiture of the goods involved. Accordingly, the government seized the glass and instituted forfeiture proceed- .
ings against it. During this proceeding, the government obtained a
co1:1rt order directing Boyd and Sons to produce an invoice that
allegedly contained proof that they were guilty as charged.
The statute pursuant to which the order was issued provided that
failure to comply with the order would be treated as a confession of the
allegations set forth in the government's petition. The Boyds com- ·
plied under protest, arguing that both the order and the statute authorizing it were unconstitutional. A unanimous Supreme Court
agreed with this contention. Because of the penalty for noncompliance, the Court held that the statute violated the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination.
. But the seven Justices subscribing to the opinion of the Court
went further. Speaking through Justice Bradley, they held that the
seizure of documents is inherently "unreasonable" within the meaning of the first clause of the fourth amendment-the "unreasonable
'search clause"-whenever the government's sole claim to them is
based on their possible utility as evidence in a criminal proceeding9
against the individual who both owns and possesses them. Further,
the majority of the Court held that, on the facts of this case, a "seizure" within the meaning of the fourth amendment had taken
place. 1° Finally, the majority held that the fifth amendment barred
the admission of the evidence that had been seized in violation of
the fourth amendment prohibition against "unreasonable" seizures.
Reflection both upon the state of the law of search and seizure
in England at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights and upon
9. This was the essence of the mere evidence rule, which provided that the fourth
amendment permitted searches and seizures only if the government had a superior
claim of title to the objects seized. Boyd drew the distinction between constitutionally permissible searches and seizures and those for mere evidence as follows:
The search for and seizure of stolen or forfeited goods, or goods liable to duties
and concealed to avoid the payment thereof, are totally different things from
a search for and seizure of a man's private books and papers for the purpose
of obtaining information therein contained, or of using them as evidence against
him. The two things differ toto coelo. In the one case, the government is
entitled to the possession of the property; in the other it is not.
116 U.S. at 623. As applied to documents, this will henceforth be referred to as
the Boyd or paper-search rule. See 116 U.S. at 629. As applied to all of an individual's possessions, including documents, it will be referred to as the Gouled or mere
evidence rule. See text at notes 25-32 infra.
10. Boyd did not involve a traditional search and seizure conducted pursuant to
a search warrant; rather, it involved a statutorily authorized court order requiring the
production of an invoice for imported goods. The invoice was introduced into evidence in the forfeiture trial. The Court held that this compulsory production was
tantamount to a search and seizure and, as such, fell within the scope of .the fourth
amendment. 116 U.S. at 621-22.
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the framers' personal familiarity with abuses of the warrant power
led the Boyd majority to decide that the unreasonable search clause
was not merely an empty preamble to the second clause of the fourth
amendment, the "warrant clause." Although the majority read the
warrant clause as merely providing certain procedural safeguards
against arbitrary governmental intrusion into a person's life, the unreasonable search clause was construed as declaring that one's personal effects were entirely immune from governmental invasion. 11
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Bradley relied primarily on
Entick v. Carrington, 12 the English case that he believed had exercised a decisive influence upon the shaping of the fourth and fifth
amendments. In that case, Lord Camden invalidated a "paper
search" conducted under the authority of a technically valid warrant.
He marshaled two arguments in defense of his holding. First, he
asserted that a seizure was pennissible-i.e., nontrespassory-only
when carried out by a party with a superior property right in the
thing seized. The right to reclaim property was similarly conditioned upon the establishment of superior title. Thus, allowing the
seizure of mere evidence would deprive the accused of a possession
that was rightfully his, a result that would be manifestly unjust. Second, Lord Camden argued that, when the evidence sought was an
individual's private papers, the search and seizure were particularly
offensive, both because "[p]apers are . . . his dearest property; and
are so far from enduring a seizure, that they will hardly bear an
inspection,"13 and because upholding this procedure would be the
equivalent of compelling him to testify against himself. 14
In order to apply the fourth amendment to the factual situation
in Boyd, Justice Bradley had to interpret "search and seizure" as
11. S~e N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMEND·
MENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 103 (1970).

12. 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (C.P. 1765).
13. 19 Howell's State Trials at 1066.
14. Lord Camden observed:
There is no process against papers in civil causes. It has often been tried, but
never prevailed. Nay, where the adversary has by force or fraud got possession
of your own proper evidence, there is no way to get it back but by action.
In the criminal law such a proceeding was never heard of; and yet there
are some crimes, such for instance as murder, rape, robbery, and house-breaking,
to say nothing of forgery and perjury, that are more atrocious than libelling.
But our law has provided no paper-search in these cases to help forward the
conviction.
Whether this proceedeth from the gentleness of the law towards criminals,
or from a consideration that such a power would be more pernicious to the
innocent than useful to the public, I will not say.
It is very certain, that the law obligeth no man to accuse himself; because
the necessary means of compelling self-accusation, falling upon the innocent
as wel] as the guilty, would be both cruel and unjust; and it would seem, that
search for evidence is disallowed upon the same principle. Then, too, the innocent would be confounded with the guilty.
19 Howell's State Trials at 1073.
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including the compulsory production of documents. 15 Arguing that
the theoretical foundation of the unreasonable search clause commanded such a reading of its text, he again turned to Entick:
The principles laid down in this opinion [Entick] affect the very
essence of constitutional liberty and security. They reach farther
than the concrete form of the case then before the court, with its
adventitious circumstances; they apply to all invasions on the part
of the government and its employes of the sanctity of a man's home
and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and
the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property, where that right has never
been forfeited by his conviction of some public offense,-it is the
invasion of this sacred right which underlies and constitutes the essence of Lord Camden's judgment. Breaking into a house and opening boxes and drawers are circumstances of aggravation; but any
forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or of
his private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime
or to forfeit his goods, is within the condemnation of that judgment.
In this regard the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into
each other. 16
Although conceding that this interpretation of the fourth amendment did not accord with a literal reading of the amendment, he
defended it with great vigor:
Though the proceeding in question is divested of many of the aggravating incidents of actual search and seizure, yet, -as before said, it
contains their substance and essence, and effects their substantial purpose. It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and
least repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices
get their first footing in that way, namely by silent approaches and
slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be
obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the
security of person and property should be liberally construed. · A
close and literal construction of them deprives them of halt their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted
more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and guard against any
stealthy encroachments thereon. Their motto should be obsta principiis.11
Finally, the Court ruled that the fifth amendment barred the admission of papers seized as mere evidence for the purpose of either
15. It was not self-evident that the compulsory production of the invoice autho•
rized by the statute fell within the meaning of "search and seizure." The government
did not remove the invoice from the Boyds' possession. Rather, it requested, and
the Court ordered, that the Boyds produce the invoice and allow the government's
attorneys to examine it and show it to the jury in their presence. See note 10 supra.
16. 116 U.S. at 630.
17. 116 U.S. at 635.
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convicting their owner-possessor of a crime or obtaining a forfeiture
of his goods. Justice Bradley commented:
We have already noticed the intimate relation between the two
amendments. They throw great light on each other. For the "unreasonable searches and seizures" condemned in the Fourth Amendment
are almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give
evidence against himself, which is condemned in the Fifth Amendment; and compelling a man "in a criminal case to be a witness
against himself," which is condemned in the Fifth Amendment,
throws light on the question as to what is an "unreasonable search
• and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. And
we have been unable to perceive that the seizure of a man's private
books and papers to be used in evidence against him is substantially
different from compelling him to be a witness against himself. We
think it is within the clear intent and meaning of those terms. 18

Thus, the Court held that the seizure of the invoice 'Violated the Boyds'
rights under the fourth amendment and that its use as evidence
against them violated their fifth amendment rights.
Justice Bradley offered no positive definition of "the indefeasible
right of personal security, personal liberty and private property"10
that he considered to be at the core of the intimate relation between
the two amendments. It is clear, however, that confidentiality was
not the interest that the Court sought to protect. Whether the Boyds
had kept the invoice a secret to the world or whether they had made
its contents a matter of public knowledge was irrelevant; either way,
the government's action was illegal. But, perhaps because the opinion was couched in such sweeping language, the positive nature of
the fundamental right was unclear.
Later courts20 interpreted Boyd as identifying the privilege
against self-incrimination as the concept at the heart of the intimate
relation. Viewing an individual's papers as an extension of his
"self," adherents of this view treated the unreasonable search clause
of the fourth amendment as an extension of the fifth amendment.
On this theory, the amendments, taken together, define the ultimate
scope of each person's right not to be compelled to serve as the
source of evidence against himself.
But this guarantee that a person's papers are free from official
18. 116 U.S. at 633.
19. 116 U.S. at 630.
20. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), discussed in text
at notes 52-56 infra; Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
In holding that an individual who has been granted immunity may be compelled
to testify against himself, the majority in Brown must have concluded that Boyd had
been solely concerned with protecting the individual from compelled self-incrimination. The four dissenting Justices, on the other hand, cited Boyd in support of the
proposition that, because the Constitution grants the individual an absolute right
to remain silent, testimony compelled under a grant of immunity is subject to constitutional attack.
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inspection was absolute only in theory. The 'Boyd majority had to
reconcile its doctrine with traditional practices. Historically, the government had been allowed to require recordkeeping with regard
to certain goods, such as those subject to duties, in which it had some
property interest, and those records had always been deemed seizable. 21 The Court in Boyd incorporated this tradition into its constitutional theory by proclaiming the seizure of documents to be inherently unconstitutional only when they were taken as mere evidence
and by granting that, on the basis of its property interest in such
goods, the government had a superior right to the corresponding records. 22 Because any such record did not truly belong to the accused,
it could not be viewed as an extension of his "self''; thus, its use
against him did not constitute a compelled self-incrimination. This •
accommodation to tradition did not seem to compromise the general
paper-search rule significantly.· The rule attached to all documents
in an individual's possession to which he had a superior claim of
right. 23 Consequently, although it was not viewed as having been
designed to protect property rights per se, 24 the scope of the privilege embodied in the unreasonable search clause came to be defined
in terms of the law of property. In that respect, the doctrine contained the seeds of its own destruction.
Thirty-five years later, in Gouled v. United States, 25 the Boyd
holding was reaffirmed and applied to a traditional search and seizure conducted pursuant to a facially valid search warrant. 26 At
Gouled's trial on charges of mail fraud, 27 various documents had
been admitted over his objections. Justice Clarke, writing for the
Court, held that, because the papers seized belonged to Gouled, their
seizure violated his fourth amendment rights irrespective of whether it
21. Apparently the invoice sought by the government in Boyd was not a required record.
22. 116 U.S. at 622-24.
23. The Court did not directly address the question of whether the privilege
would apply to papers owned by the accused, but in another person's custody. See
text at notes 105-07 (discussing Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 ( 1973) ).
24. However, the rule was fully consistent with the prevailing social theory,
· which had been well stated by Lord Camden a century and a half earlier in En tick
v. Carrington:
The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their property.
That right is preserved sacred and incommunicable in all 'instances, where it has
not been taken away or abridged by some public law for the good of the
whole. . . . By the laws of England, every invasion of private property, be
it ever so minute, is a trespass. No man can set his foot upon my ground
without my licence, but he is liable to an action, though the damage be
nothing.
19 Howell's State Trials at 1066.
25. 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
26. Some documents had been seized pursuant to a warrant; another had been
obtained by stealth. 255 U.S. at 303.
27. Gouled was convicted for conspiring to defraud the United States (Fed.
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was accomplished pursuant to a warrant. 28 Moreover, because that
seizure rendered him "the unwilling source of the evidence," 20 admission of that evidence violated his fifth amendment rights. 30
At the end of his opinion, Justice Clarke observed that "[t]here
is no special sanctity in papers" 31 that should cause them to be regarded differently from other types of personal property. This passing remark, which was not without support in Boyd, 82 reflected the
common-sense judgment that, if the government's appropriation of
an individual's documents as mere evidence is wrongful because it
makes him "the unwilling source" of incriminating evidence, the
same must be true of the seizure of any of his other possessions.
Its effect, however, was to transform the paper-search rule of Boyd
into a broader rule under which the search for or seizure of any
item as "mere evidence" was proscribed. In this roundabout way,
the fourth amendment in fact became the protector of privacy.
JI.

THE RETREAT FROM ABSOLUTISM

By defining the unreasonable search clause in terms of a property-interest theory, the Court in Boyd hoped to develop a doctrine
that would provide the maximum possible protection for the individual consistent with certain traditionally accepted practices. On
the one hand, the rule condoned attachment, sequestration, or execution pursuant to a judicial writ, as well as seizure of goods that
were contraband, 33 stolen, forfeited, or liable to duties, 34 because
Crim. Code, ch. 321, § 37, 35 Stat. 1096 (1909)) and for using the mails to promote a scheme to defraud the United States (Fed. Crim. Code, ch. 321, § 215,
35 Stat. 1130 (1909)).
28. The Court could have disposed of the case on the ground that the Espionage
Act of 1917, ch. 30, tit. XI, 40 Stat. 217, 228, pursuant to which the warrant was
issued, did not authorize the seizure of mere evidence. Instead, the Court took the
opportunity to review the broad holding of Boyd.
29. 255 U.S. at 306.
30. The Court wholeheartedly endorsed the spirit underlying Justice Bradley's
view in Boyd. Justice Clarke declared:
It would not be possible to add to the emphasis with which the Framers of our
Constitution and this Court . . . have declared the importance to political liberty
and the welfare of our country of the due observance of the rights guaranteed
under the Constitution by these two Amendments. The effect of the decisions
cited is: that such rights are declared to be indispensable to the "full enjoyment
of personal security, personal liberty and private property;" that they are to be
regarded as of the very essence of constitutional liberty.
255 U.S. at 303-04.
31. 255 U.S. at 309.
32. See 116 U.S. at 623-24.
33. An individual cannot legally own contraband; thus, the government's title
therein must be superior to the individual's.
34. Thus, the traditionally accepted practice of governmental seizure of records
required by law to be kept in regard to goods liable to duties was also permissible.
See text at note 22 supra.
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they involved the seizure of property to which the government's
claim of title was superior to that of the individual from whom it
was seized. On the other hand, the Court placed such a premium
on the interest at the core of. the "intimate relation" that Boyd and
Gouled were infused with the unspoken judgment that the class of
cases in which the government would be deemed to have a superior
property right was fixed eternally by the common law of 1791. No
~ place existed in this scheme for any "development" of the mere evidence rule, since that would entail a reduction in the scope of that
fundamental interest.
However, over the years, the Court grew increasingly dissatisfied
with interpreting the unreasonable search clause in terms of property
interests. This dissatisfaction had several possible sources. Traditional views of the sanctity of property were quickly giving way
to the demand for increasing governmental control over its ownership, use, and disposition. The view that a fundamental right to privacy exists, espoused in the famous article by Brandeis and Warren, 35 was gaining acceptance. This concept was defined in terms
of a basic right "to be left alone," 36 rather than in terms of the technicalities of English property law. Finally, perhaps the Court simply
was not content with the results that would have been entailed by
strict adherence to the mere evide~ce rule as it had been propounded in Boyd and expanded by Gouled.
Where strict adherence would not interfere with governmental
regulation of economic activity, the rule was duly applied. Johnson
v. United States, 37 which involved an indictment of a bankrupt for
fraudulent concealment of funds from the trustee in bankruptcy, is
illustrative. The defendant claimed that the fifth amendment privilege precluded the admission into evidence of his financial records,
which had been transferred to the trustee against his will. The
Court held, consistent with Boyd, that the subpoena could be enforced because title to the records had passed to the trustee when
bankruptcy was declared.
Where the mere evidence rule interfered with governmental
regulation of economic activity, however, it was modified or "refined." In a group of cases involving subpoenas directed to pusiness
organizations, the Court refused to include such associations within
the class of entities protected by the fifth amendment privilege. In
Hale v. Henkel, 38 the Court held that the privilege does not apply
35.
36.
ing).
37.
38.

Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAR.v. L. REv. 193 (1890).
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissent228 U.S. 257 (1913).
201 U.S. 43 (1906).
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to corporations. Thus, an agent cannot refuse to answer questions
or to comply with a subpoena duces tecum89 on the ground that the
corporation might be incriminated. Moreover, because the documents are in the custody of and are being subpoenaed from the corporate entity rather than from the agent, the agent cannot refuse
to comply on the ground that compliance might incriminate him. 40
Possibly Hale can be reconciled with the mere evidence rule on
the ,theory that somehow the government has a quasi-property right to
corporate records because of the unique historical relationship between the corporation and the state.41 But such a theory cannot explain the result in United States v. White. 42 In that case, the Court
held that the fifth amendment does not shield any collective entity,
whether incorporated or not, from a subpoena duces tecum so long
as the organization has an existence independent of and distinct from
that of its individual members. Without addressing the previously
paramount question of who had superior title to the documents, the
Court justified its holding merely on the policy ground that a contrary
result would severely hinder the government's attempts to regulate
commerce.
Of the decisions that considered Boyd during this period of retreat, perhaps Shapiro v. United States43 had the greatest impact on
the individual's ability to shield the details of his life from the government. In that case the Court enunciated the "required records"
doctrine, under which no person can invoke the fourth or fifth
amendment to justify refusal to comply with a facially valid subpoena
compelling the production of records that the person is legally required to keep. This decision represented a complete rejection of
the fundamental limitations that the Court in Boyd had placed on
the government's power to compel the production of records kept
pursuant to its command. The Court in effect recognized the power

39. The order involved in the Boyd case differed from a subpoena duces tecum
only in the penalty imposed for noncompliance. Hale held that the paper-search rule
enunciated in Boyd applied as well to subpoenas duces tecum.
40. In Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911), the writ was directed to
the corporation. In Dreier v. United States, 221 U.S. 394 (1911), it was directed
to the agent. In both cases the Court held that the self-incrimination clause did not
allow the agent to refuse to comply with the subpoena. It was later held, however,
that the custodian of an organization's "missing" documents can refuse to answer
questions about their whereabouts when to do so would incriminate him. Curcio v.
United States, 354 U.S. 118, 125 (1957~.
4'1. Traditionally the state has exercised special powers over corporations, such
as the right of visitation. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 89 (1974); Hale
v. Henkel, 201 U.S. at 75.
42. 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
43. 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
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of the legislature to acquire any and all information it wants from
an individual. 44
The Court also narrowed the scope of the protection provided
by the mere evidence rule in Marron v. United States. 45 In that
case the Court distinguished between property that is merely evidence of a crime and property used in the commission of a _crime. 46
· Whereas Gouled had allowed the seizure of an instrumentality of
a crime only insofar as it was contraband, Marron allowed the seizure
of any such instrumentality. Because even papers can be characterized as instrumentalities of crime, 47 Marron represented a serious
threat to the zone of protection established by Boyd and broadened
by Gouled. 48
ill.

\

THE PRIVACY REVOLUTION

A.

The Beginning

To the extent that the decisions following Boyd and Gouled reduced the obstacles to governmental seizure of an individual's property, they also narrowed his effective zone of privacy. A conflict
arose within the Court over this development. Although the dispute
concerned the fundamental nature of the rights protected by the
fourth and fifth amendments, it took the form of a debate over
the "real" meaning of Boyd. On the one hand, proponents of
the traditional interpretation of Boyd believed that the core of the
"intimate relation" between the amendments was the privilege against
self-incrimination. Since the key question to these Justices was
whether the evidence belonged to the defendant, they found the government's increasing power to intrude into the life of the individual
44. Congress eventually exercised this authority to require the keeping of records
to aid its fight against crime, as well as its regulation of economic activity. On the
basis of this "required records" doctrine, the Court has sanctioned congressional enactments that have intruded substantially upon personal privacy. See United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 447 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); California Bankers Assn.
v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 93 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting). But see Grosso v.
United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968); Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
45. 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
46. The Court in Marron did not attempt to explain its holding in terms of a
superior title theory. A possible rationale for the decision is that, by using an object
to commit a crime, the criminal has forfeited it to the state.
47. In Marron, the Court treated records maintained in an establishment where
liquor was sold as instrumentalities. Gouled had also recognized that papers might
be used as instrumentalities of crime. See 255 U.S. at 309.
48. For a discussion of the ingenuity of prosecutors in characteijzing different
types of property as instrumentalities, see Comment, The Search and Seizure of Private Papers: Fourth and Fifth Amendment Considerations, 6 LoY. L.A.L. REV. 274,
282-83 (1973).
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to be constitutionally permissible so long as the exercise of that
power was consistent with the rules of property law. On the other
hand, advocates of a revisionist interpretation of Boyd argued that
the true concern of the framers of the fourth and fifth amendments
was the protection of a fundamental right of privacy. 40
The latter position made its debut in the bizarre case of Perlman
v. United Stat_es. 50 Perlman had introduced his own documents into
evidence in a successful patent infringement suit. His company then
instituted similar proceedings against another defendant, and he
again introduced the papers into evidence in connection with his own
testimony. A dismissal without prejudice was granted on the condition that the documents be left in the court's custody. Later, when
Perlman was charged with perjury in connection with testimony that
he had given in regard to the exhibits, the United States attorney
moved to obtain possession of these items for use before a grand
jury. When Perlman learned that his attorney had failed to object
to this motion, he sought to enjoin the United States attorney from
taking possession of the documents, which were undeniably his own
property, on the basis of the mere evidence rule. The Supreme
Court's decision to affirm the denial of the injunction appears to have
been based at least in part on the novel proposition that, by publicizing the documents through their introduction into the court record, Perlman had forfeited his right to object to their seizure and
use against him. To some extent, then, the Court's emphasis was
on the lack of intrusion upon Perlman's privacy. 51
This revisionist interpretation of the "intimate relation" first appeared as a fully articulated doctrine in Justice Brandeis' dissent in
Olmstead v. United States. 52 That case concerned the applicability
of the fourth amendment to warrantless wiretapping by government
agents. The majority, which was as eager to facilitate the government's efforts to combat crime as it had been a year earlier in Mar49. See note 72 infra.
50. 247 U.S. 7 (1918).
51. The Court also seemed to base its decision on the fact that Perlman had voluntarily yielded custody of the papers to the district court. It suggested that the
privilege recognized in Boyd applied only to papers owned by, and in the possession
of, the accused. See 241 U.S. at 14-15. Dictum in Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S •
.465 (1921), from which Justices Holmes and Brandeis dissented, stated that the
fourth and fifth amendments are not necessarily offended when documents owned by
the accused are seized by the state while in the custody of a third party. This proposition lay dormant until its formal adoption by the Court in Couch v. United States,
409 U.S. 322 (1973). See text at notes 101-07 infra. But cf. Ex parte Jackson,
96 U.S. 727 (1877) (dictum disallowing warrantless seizure of a defendant's property
in the possession of the Postal Service).
S2. 277 l,J.S. 438 (1928),

November 1977]

Boyd v. United States

195

ron, analyzed the issue in terms of the privilege against self-incrimination, 53 whose parameters were determined by property law. Finding that speech is not property within the context of the fourth
amendment, they concluded that .wiretapping infringed upon an
interest protected by the fourth amendment, and thereby the fifth,
only if it involved trespassing upon the accused's tangible property.
Justice Brandeis' dissent, however, argued that the majority opinion
was based on the false premise that the fourth amendment had been
designed either to perpetuate antiquated notions of English property
law or to bolster the privilege against self-incrimination. 54 In Justice
Brandeis' view, at the heart of Entick, Boyd, and Gouled was the
premise that the amendment had been designed to protect a fundamental "right to be left alone": 55
Every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the private
life of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed
a violation of the Fourth Amendment. And the use, as eviqence
in a criminal proceeding, of facts ascertained by such intrusion must
be deemed a violation of the Fifth. 56

Although Justice Brandeis had lost the battle in Olmstead, by
the second half of the twentieth century he had won the war. The
theory that his dissenting opinion espoused eventually became the
official position of the Court. 57 Moreover, during this period it became ~clear that the mere evidence rule had outlived its usefulness.
The criteria for determining whether an object was immune from
seizure had become so structured that the rule no longer served as
a bulwark for the privilege against self-incrimination. Furthermore,
the rule was at odds with public opinion, as it frustrated the popular
demand for law and order that was increasing along with the crime
rate.
Although Justice Brandeis had identified the right of privacy as
the basic interest to be protected, he had indicated neither the manner in which this protection would be ensured nor the extent to
which the law derived from Boyd would have to be repudiated. The
Court undertook this task in three cases decided three decades after
53. See 277 U.S. at 462-63.
54. Justice Brandeis advocated a privacy rationale for the fifth amendment, also.
See text at note 56 infra.
55. 277 U.S. at 478.
56. 277 U.S. at 478-79.
57. Regarding the fourth amendment, see, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27
(1949) ("The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police .•.
is at the core of the Fourth Amendment."). Regarding the fifth amendment, see,
e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) ("The Fifth Amendment in
its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which
government may not force him to surrender to his detriment.").
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Olmstead: Schmerber v. California,U 8 Warden v. Hayden/' 0 and
Katz v. United States. 60
B.

The Decisive Steps: Schmerber, Hayden, Katz

The consequences of redefining the fourth and fifth amendments
became clear in the mid-1960s. In Schmerber v. California, the
Court established that the fifth amendment privilege and,. by implication, the unreasonable search clause, protects the individual only
against the seizure of "testimonial" or "communicative" evidence.
Next, in Warden v. Hayden, it repudiated the rationale of Gouled,
holding that there is no constitutionally significant distinction between mere evidence, on the one hand, and instrumentalities, contraband, and fruits of crime, on the other. Searches and seizures of
the former would no longer be unreasonable per se. However, Hayden left open the possibility that "testimonial" or "communicative"
evidence would still receive absolute protection, and thus it did not
disturb the "intimate relation" doctrine propounded by Boyd. But
then, in Katz v. United States, the Court intimated that it was ready
to discard the concept of the "intimate relation" entirely.
Schmerber marked the first stage in the Court's rethinking of
the Boyd doctrine. The defendant in that case was hospitalized for
injuries sustained in an automobile accident. Having detected liquor
on his breath at the scene of the accident, a police officer arrested
Schmerber at the hospital and directed a doctor to take a sample
of his blood. The sample was taken over Schmerber's objections
and was subjected to tests that indicated that he had been intoxicated
while driving. The test results were introduced into evidence over
Schmerber's objections, and he was convicted of drunk driving.
By a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. Perhaps the most striking aspect of the Court's opinion, written
by Justice Brennan, was the manner in which"it dealt with the fourth
and fifth amendment questions. 61 The traditional approach would
have begun with an inquiry into whether the seizure62 of Schmerber's
blood had violated the mere evidence rule. Upon reaching the conclusion that it had ( which could not be doubted since the state had
no proprietary interest in his blood), the Court would have simply
58. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
59. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
60. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
61. In addition to the fourth and fifth amendment arguments discussed in the
text, Schmerber objected to the introduction of the evidence on due process and sixth
amendment grounds. The Supreme Court sustained the state courts' rulings against
him on these claims as well.
62. The Court determined that taking a blood sample was a "seizure" within the
meaning of the fourth amendment. 384 U.S. at 767.
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declared, citing Gouled, that the seizure was in contravention of
the fourth amendment and that the use of the test results as evidence in the trial was repugnant to the filth amendment.
But Justice Brennan approached the problem differently. At the
core of his analysis was the judgment that Boyd and Gouled were
"not instructive in this context." 63 This thinly veiled renunciation
of those cases was not surprising, since the Court now professed to
believe that "[t]he overriding function of the Fourth Amendment
is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State." 64 What was unexpected, however, was that Justice Brennan replaced the traditional property-oriented approach to
the "intimate relation" with an analysis grounded on a new interpretation of the fifth amendment, rather than on the right to privacy.
As Justice Black pointed· out in his dissent in Schmerber, Justice
Bradley's majority opinion in Boyd had advocated a liberal construction of the fourth and fifth amendments in order to secure the fullest
possible protection of individual rights. 65 But Justice Brennan now
read the fifth amendment as protecting Jess than the whole "complex
of values it helps to protect." 66 Thus, while Justice Clarke for the
Court in Gouied 'had believed that compelling an individual to submit to the seizure of any of his property so that it might be used
against him in a criminal proceeding was to compel him to be a witness against himself within the meaning of the fifth amendment, J ustice Brennan was willing to hold the fifth amendment applicable in
such settings only when the property was testimonial or communicative. 67
By distinguishing between "testimonial" or "communicative" evidence on the one hand and "real" evidence on the other, Justice
Brennan was _able to uphold such traditional police practices as compelling suspects to submit to fingerprinting or to produce handwriting
or voice exemplars. 68 But, in s.o doing, he was fo~ced to recognize 63. 384 U.S. at 768. See note 70 infra.
64. 384 U.S. at 767.
.
65. 384 U.S..at 776-77. Justice Black supported the Boyd Court on this point,
in striking contrast to the strict literalism for which he was so famous. See, e.g.,
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), in which he refused to treat eavesdropping as a search and seizure:
[l]f they [the framers of the Constitution] had desired to outlaw or restrict the
use of eavesdropping, I believe that they would have used the appropriate language to do so in the Fourth Amendment. They certainly would not have left
such a task to the ingenuity of language-stretching judges.
389 U.S. 366 (dissenting opinion).
66. 384 U.S. at 762.
67. 384 U.S. at 764.
68. Ultimately, the Court did pass on the constitutionality of compelling the production of voice and handwriting exemplars. ifn United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218 (1967) (production of voice exemplar requireq. at lineup), and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (handwriting exemplar used at trial), both 5-4 deci-
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the privileged status of papers, which the Court in Gouled had expressly refused to do. As Justice Black pointed out in his Schmerber
dissent, "[i]t is a strange hierarchy of values that allows the state to
extract a human being's blood to convict him because of the blood's
content but proscribes compelled production of his lifeless papers." 00
Nonetheless; this was the "hierarchy of values" that Justice Brennan adopted in upholding Schmerber's conviction. Because the defendant's blood was "real" evidence, its use at his trial did not violate the fifth amendment. Neither did its seizure violate the fourth
amendment. But Justice Brennan did not explain how this latter
conclusion followed from the fact that the blood was not "testimonial" evidence. 70 He certainly did not attempt to justify it in
terms of the privacy-oriented concerns that he had proclaimed to
be central to the fourth amendment.
lit was not until Warden v. Hayden,11 decided one year after
Schmerber, that Justice Brennan approached the fourth amendment
question in terms of a fundamental right to privacy. Various items
of clothing, seized by police in "hot pursuit" of a robbery suspect,
were admitted at Hayden's trial to identify him as the thief. Following his conviction, Hayden sought habeas corpus relief on the
sions, the Court rejected the claim that these practices were repugnant to the fifth
amendment; in both cases the Court reasoned that the procedures do not compel thr.
production of "testimonial" evidence. Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion in
each case. In United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (voice exemplar subpoenaed by grand jury), and United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973) (handwriting exemplar subpoenaed by grand jury), the Court added that the compulsion to
produce the exemplars does not offend the fourth amendment because an h;idividual
has no reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the characteristics of his voice or
handwriting.
Although this lack of an expectation of privacy in the evidence seized-the real
distinction between the seizure of these exemplars and the seizure of a man's private
papers-might bear on the validity of a fourth amendment claim, it is logically irrelevant to a fifth amendment claim. Thus, even though the fourth amendment might
not prohibit these practices, the fifth amendment could. See note 122 infra and accompanying text.
69. 384 U.S. at 775.
70. Justice Brennan conceded that drawing blood constituted a "search and
seizure" within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 384 U.S. at 769-70. But he
distinguished cases involving intrusions into "houses, papers, and effects," such as
Boyd and Gouled, from the instant case. 384 U.S. at 767-68. The former involved
governmental interference with property relationships, while the latter was an intrusion into the defendant's person. Accordingly, in the instant case the Court was
writing "on a clean slate." 384 U.S. at 768. Although this analysis arguably suffices
to explain why the Court chose not to apply the traditional property analysis, it does
not even begin to explain the leap in reasoning from the holding that Schmerber's
blood was not "testimonial" evidence-a fifth amendment issue-to the conclusion
that its seizure did not violate the fourth amendment. It seems that Justice Brennan
drew this inference on the basis of his belief that, due to the "intimate relation" between the two amendments, the scope of the fourth is defined in this context by the
scope of the fifth.
71. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
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ground that the seizure and admission of this "mere evidence" was unconstitutional. In upholding the conviction, the Court, through Justice Brennan, reexamined and expressly repudiated the mere evidence rule on two distinct grounds. First, Justice Brennan maintained that the rule bore no real relation to the protection of privacy,
which the entire Court now viewed as the essence of the fourth
amendment. 72 He observed that
[p]rivacy is disturbed no more by a search directed to a purely evidentiary object than it is by a search directed to an instrumentality,
fruit, or contraband. . . . Moreover, nothing in the nature of property
seized as evidence renders it more private than property seized, for
example, as an instrumentality; quite the opposite may be true. Indeed, the distinction is wholly irrational, since, depending on the circumstances, the same "papers and effects" may be "mere evidence"
in one case and "instrumentality" in another. 73
Furthermore, Justice Brennan recognized that the rule "has spawned
exceptions so numerous and confusion so great, in fact, that it is
questionable whether it affords meaningful protection"u to privacy
at all.
Second, Justice Brennan determined that the original raisons
d'etre for the rule were no longer compelling. 75 Since Silverman
v. United States76 and Schmerber--which Justice Brennan now acknowledged had disregarded the mere evidence rule77-had overthrown the traditional rule that "a lawful seizure presupposed a superior claim, " 78 the true owner of seized property could recover it after
the trial. Thus, the rule was no longer necessary to protect property
rights. Moreover, Justice Brennan asserted that the exclusionary
rule-which renders unconstitutionally seized evidence inadmissible
in a criminal prosecution-now provided a sufficient remedy against
official conduct violative of an individual's fourth amendment
12. But see Justice Douglas' dissent:
That there is a zone that no police can enter-whether in "hot pursuit" or
armed with a meticulously proper warrant-has been emphasized by Boyd and
by Gouled. They have been consistently and continuously approved. I would
adhere to them and leave with the individual the choice of opening his private
effects (apart from contraband and the like) to the police or keeping their
contents a secret and their integrity inviolate. The existence of that choice is
the very essence of the right to privacy. Without it the Fourth Amendment
and the Fifth are ready instruments for the police state that the Framers sought
to avoid.
387 U.S. at 325 (footnote omitted).
73. 387 U.S. at 301-02.
74. 387 U.S. at 309.
75. 387 U.S. at 303-08.
76. 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (warrantless use of electronic listening device inserted
into party wall is unconstitutional regardless of whether technical trespass occurred).
77. 387 U.S. at 301 n.8.
78. 387 U.S. at 304.
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rights. 79 Accordingly, the majority rejected the mere evidence rule
without ever facing dissenting Justice Douglas' contention that, as
a matter of historical fact, the rule was constitutionally mandated.
At first glance, it might seem that the Court was now completely
opposed to the position, espoused by Justice Douglas in his dissent
in Warden v. Hayden, 80 that the unreasonable search clause guaranteed to the individual the right to keep at least s0me types of property absolutely beyond the reach of the government. Justice Brennan noted that Hayden's clothing was not "testimonial" or "communicative," however, and thus its introduction into evidence did not
compel him to become a witness against himself in violation of the
fifth amendment. "[W]hether there are items of evidential value
whose very nature precludes them from being the object of a reasonable search and seizure" 81 remained an open question Thus, although the Hayden majority rejected the broad basis for the decision
in Gouled, the Court appeared to leave the paper-search rule established in Boyd intact. Indeed, the communicative-evidence rule
promised to offer even greater protection for private papers than had
the original Boyd rule, since the Court now rejected the view that
the constitutionality of seizures of evidence was controlled by property fights. But, at the same time, Justice Brennan's opinion cast
doubt on the continued vitality of the Boyd rule. Insofar as the distinction drawn in Schmerber between testimonial and real evidence
could not be. rationalized in terms of privacy considerations, the
promise held out in that case's majority opinion was empty. Nonetheless, the Court in Hayden did appear to suggest ~at it would recognize and protect an inviolable zone of personal privacy. That illusion was dispelled in Katz v. United States, 82 a decision which has
appropriately been described as "one step forward, one step back."88
Since Silverman, 84 the Court had moved slowly but persistently
in applying its right-to-privacy interpretation of the fourth amendment to the law of electronic surveillance. Contrary to Olmstead, 8G
Wong Sun v. United States8 6 implied that speech could be "seized"
within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Subsequently, Berger
79. 387 U.S. at 307.
80. See note 72 supra.
81. 387 U.S. at 303 .
. 82. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
83. Spritzer, Electronic Surveillance by Leave of the Magistrate: The Case
in Opposition, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 172 (1969). This controversial article contains a more thorough discussion of the problems unique to electronic surveillance
than is appropriate here. In addition, see Kamisar, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping
Probl~m: A Professors View, 44 MINN. L. REV. 891 (1960).
84. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961), discussed in note 76 supra.
85. Olmstead v. United States, 227 U.S. 438 (1928), discussed in text at notes
52-56 supra.
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v. United States81 held that wiretapping constituted a search and seizure subject to the restraints of the fourth amendment. But the
Court had not yet fully liberated its thinking about electronic surveillance from the lingering influence of old beliefs about the fourth
amendment. Even in Berger, it still clung to the property-oriented .
notion that speech is protected only within "constitutionally protected
areas." 88 Thus, further modification was required to bring the law
of electronic surveillance into line with the rest of the "new" fourth
amendment law. This harmonization was accomplished in Katz.
Katz had been convicted of transmitting wagering information
by telephone in violation of a federal statute. At trial, the government introduced evidence obtained through use of a monitoring device
that FBI agents had attached to the outside wall of the public telephone
booth that Katz had frequented. Rejecting once and for all the view
that a fourth amendment violation occurs only when the government
trespasses into a traditionally "constitutionally protected area," the
Supreme Court reversed the conviction. The Court brought the
electronic surveillance cases back into the mainstream of fourth
amendment law by holding that "[t]he Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places. "89
But, at the same time, the Court radically altered its basic fourth
amendment theory in two ways. First, it reduced the scope of the
amendment's protection by limiting the interest it protected. Justice
Stewart, writing for the Court, explained that "what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not
a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. . . . But what he
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public,
may be constitutionally protected." 90 Justice Harlan, whose concurring opinion in Katz has been accorded great weight, 91 offered his
interpretation of the new fourth amendment standard:
As the Court's opinion states, "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." The question, however, is what protection it affords
to those people. . . . My understanding of the rule . . . is that
there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable. "92
86. 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (verbal communication protected by fourth amendment).
87. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
88. 388 U.S. at 59.
89. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
90. 389 U.S. at 351-52 (emphasis added).
91. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
92. 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan later questioned
this analysis in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 768 (1971) (Harlan, J., dis-
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This analysis was a retreat from accepted legal principles. 98 Although it arguably justified the decisions in the cases involving organizational and required records, the Court had never before suggested that any incriminating document was subject to seizure if its
owner simply had failed to maintain a sufficient expectation of privacy
with regard to it. 94 Indeed, Justice Harlan's analysis was inimical to
the premise underlying Boyd and Schmerber95-that the fourth
amendment is intimately related to the fifth. These lines of thought
are necessarily incompatible. Because the protection afforded
by the fifth amendment is absolute, a court subscribing to the principles underlying Boyd would be logically compelled to conclude that
even an individual who had told his entire neighborhood that he
possessed papers proving him guilty of a crime had not relinquished
his right to prevent their seizure and use as evidence against him. 00 In
indicating that the Court would now arrive at the contrary conclusion,
Katz revealed that the majority of Justices no longer believed that the
two amendments were intimately related.
In redefining the very nature of fourth amendment protection
as well as the interests protected, Katz made a second major break
with the past. If the determination that eavesdropping without a
trespassory invasion could constitute a search and seizure had been
made prior to Schmerber and Hayden, it is clear how the Court
would have decided Katz. If the government had a cognizable claim
:to the words seized, the Court would have held the search and seizure
unreasonable on the ground that it had been conducted without a
warrant. But if the government had no such claim, as was the case
in Katz, the Court would have held the search and seizure unreasonable per se. 97
Even under Schmerber and Hayden, the search could have been
declared unreasonable per se. Indeed, in leaving open the possibility that the constitutional significance of the distinction between
"testimonial" and "real" evidence recognized in Schmerber would
survive the death of the mere evidence rule, Hayden had indicated
senting). For a critical analysis of the reasonable expectation of privacy standard,
see Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz Expectation of Privacy Test, 76 MICH, L.
REV. 154 (1977).
93. In Boyd, for example, the seized document was an invoice belonging to a
business partnership, rather than a private document.
94. Perlman.v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918), discussed in notes 50-51 supra
and accompanying text, is consistent with this assertion because the defendant had
both relinquished custody of his papers and publicized them by introduction into
the court record.
95. See text at note 64 supra; note 70 supra.
96. See note 122 infra.
91. Compare Spritzer, supra note 83, with Kamisar, supra note 83. To bring
the conversation in Katz under the instrumentalities exception would have been to
allow the exception to swallow up the mere evidence rule.
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that some area of absolute protection, albeit narrow, would be preserved. Because Katz's words were "testimonial," they should have
fallen within that area.
Instead, the Katz Court suggested that the only constitutional deficiency of the eavesdropping was the agents' failure to obtain a warrant. 98 The implication was that once probable cause is established,
a valid warrant can be issued in any case. Thus, in substituting reasonable expectations of privacy for property rights as the focus of
.fourth amendment protection, the Court was not substituting one
inviolable interest for another. It appears that the Court now believed
that the sole function of that amendment is to ensure that privacy is
not invaded in an arbitrary manner, rather than to ensure that privacy
receives absolute protection against invasion.
Thus, in rejecting the notion that the fourth and fifth amendments are "intimately related," the Court in Katz also rejected the
notion that the fourth amendment protects an inviolable zone· of personal privacy. 99 But although the Court eschewed the absolutist
view advanced in Boyd, discussion of that case was conspicuously
absent from all of the opinions filed in Katz. 100 This omission was
remarkable in that Katz was the case in which the Court sought to
give full expression to the revision of fourth amendment law that had
begun with Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead. Yet the question
left open in Hayden-whether an inviolable zone of privacy existed
-.formally remained open after Katz.
IV.

A.

THE REJECTION OF

AN ABSOLUTE
RIGHT TO PRIVACY

Deja Vu: Narrowing the Boyd Right to Privacy

As the 1960s came to an end, Boyd was in full retreat. After
a ''law and order'' President took office and appointed four new
members to the Supreme Court, the question became when, rather
than whether, Boyd would finally be overruled. The Burger Court's
initial moves in this area were cautious. It avoided a frontal attack
on the decision, contenting itself with confining Boyd within its
"proper" bounds.
Couch v. United States101 presented the first opportunity for the
Burger Court to apply the law that had developed since Schmerber
to a seizure of documents. Couch, the sole proprietress of a res98. See 389 U.S. at 354.
99. The immunity doctrine imposed another restriction on the constitutional
protection of personal privacy. See note 20 supra.
100. Boyd was mentioned only in Justice Black's dissenting opinion, as part of a
quotation from Olmstead. See 389 U.S. at 368 (dissenting opinion).
101. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
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taurant, was under investigation by the IRS for possible tax fraud.
After giving her Miranda warnings, an IRS agent issued a summons
1
to her accountant to produce all of Couch's financial and tax records
in his possession. In response, the accountant turned the documents
over to Couch's attorney. When the agent petitioned the district
court to enforce the summons, Couch intervened.
Couch argued that, under Boyd, the government could not seize
incriminating documents from a third party who had obtained them
as a result of his confidential relationship with their owner. She
claimed that such a seizure would render the owner the unwilling
source of self-incriminating evidence.102
The Court, through Justice Powell, responded with a confusing
opinion. 103 At the heart of its reasoning lay the judgment, which
had been latent in Katz, that the fourth and fifth amendments are
basically unrelated. Despite broad language to the effect that privacy is one of the values protected by the fifth amendment as well
as by the fourth, 104 the Court ultimately concluded that the amendments do not operate in tandem to safeguard some fundamental
right. Rather, the privilege against self-incrimination was designed
to prevent the state from extorting testimony from an accused person, whereas the fourth amendment was designed to provide a procedural protection for personal privacy. Thus, the two aspects of
Couch's claim were treated.as distinct claims.
The issue central to the resolution of Couch's fifth amendment
claim was whether possession or ownership controls the scope of
the fifth amendment privilege. Asserting that the privilege is designed
to prevent the extortion of testimony from a defendant, the Court
concluded that the privilege applies only when the accused himself is compelled to produce the evidence. Thus, because Couch
did not possess the documents, the privilege did not protect her.
The Court conceded that "situations may well arise where constructive possession is so clear or the relinquishment of possession is so
temporary and insignificant as to leave the compulsion upon the
accused substantially intact."105 This exception was inapplicable,
102. She argued that Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457 (1913), Perlman
v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918), and Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921),
were distinguishable. In Johnson, title to the records was held by a trustee, see text
at note 37 supra. In Perlman, the defendant had relinquished either his ownership
or his right to privacy by introducing the documents into evidence in a public judicial
proceeding; see text at notes 50-51 supra. In Burdeau, a private citizen, rather than
the government, had seized the documents; see note 51 supra.
103. Cf. 409 U.S. at 344 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority
fails to supply a clearly articulated basis for its holding).
104. "By its yery nature, the privilege [against self-incrimination] is an intimate
and personal one. It respects a private inner sanctum of individual feeling and
thought . . . ." 409 U.S. at 327.
105. 409 U.S. at 333.
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however, since Couch's accountant was an independent contractor. 106
Since Couch had neither actual nor constructive possession of the
documents, her fifth amendment privilege had not been violated.
Rather than responding to Couch's argument that the rationale underlying Boyd applied equally to her situation, the Court merely "distinguished" Boyd on the ground that the Boyds had both owned and
possessed the seized invoice.107
Couch's fourth amendment claim was quickly dismissed with a
citation to Katz. Because she did not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy with regard to records she had relinquished to her accountant and because the summons was technically proper, the seizure was deemed constitutional.108 But the case can be read as suggesting that the same result would have been reached even if Couch
had had a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Bellis v. United States109 provided the Court with an opportunity
to reexamine the prior cases concerning organizational documents
in light of the recent developments in fifth amendment law. A federal grand jury investigating Bellis' personal tax fraud liability subpoenaed him to produce the financial records of a dissolved law partnership of which he had been a member. Justice Marshall, writing
for eight members of the Court, identified two primary policy considerations that had guided modem courts in deciding cases concerning
documentary subpoenas: protecting " 'the natural individual from
compulsory incrimination through his own testimony or personal records' "110 and protecting "an individual's right to a 'private enclave
where he may lead a private life.' " 111
From these two policies, Justice Marshall derived a test to
determine whether Bellis could invoke the fifth amendment privilege. If the records belonged to the partnership as an entity-that
is, if Bellis held them on behalf of the partnership-the privilege
could not be invoked. But if they belonged to Bellis personally,
the privilege would supply grounds for refusing to comply with the
106. Justice Douglas protested tbat tbis approach discriminated against tbose taxpayers who cannot afford (or do not need) a full-time accountant, because it put
them in the position, practically speaking, of having to waive tbeir privilege against
self-incrimination in order to attempt to comply with the complex tax laws. 409 U.S.
at 342 n.4 (dissenting opinion).
,
107. 409 U.S. at 330.
108. 409 U.S. at 335-36 & n.19.
109. 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
110. 417 U.S. at 89-90 (quoting with approval United States v. White, 322, U.S.
694, 701 (1944) ).
111. 417 U.S. at 91 (quoting witb approval Murphy v. Waterfront Commn., 378
U.S. 52, 55 ( 1964)). Other cases indicate that at this time this was in fact a guiding
principle only for Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Douglas. See, e.g., Couch v.
United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973), discussed in text at notes 101-08 supra, in which
Justice Brennan concurred separately, and Justices Marshall and Douglas dissented.
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subpoena. Applying the test to the facts of the case, the Court determined that the records belonged to the partnership and, thus, that
the enforcement of the subpoena would not violate Bellis' fifth
amendment privilege. Furthermore, it concluded that, although the
business records of a sole practitioner or a single proprietor or the
personal records of any individual would be immune from subpoena
so long as they were in that individual's possession, the privilege would
not protect the financial records of any par.tnership, with the possible
exception of those in which there were preexisting confidential relationships between partners.112
The implication of the Bellis decision, of course, was that Boyd
had been incorrectly decided. Justice Marshall was reluctant to
overrule that case because he was unwilling to hold that there are
no documents that are totally immune from seizure. But, because
Boyd represented an indistinguishable precedent, he could not ignore it. He attempted to escape this dilemma by commenting that
[i]t is true that the notice to produce involved in Boyd was in fact
issued to E.A. Boyd & Sons, a partnership. . . . However, at this
early stage in the development of our Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, the potential significance of this fact was not observed by
either the parties or the Court. ... We do not believe that the Court
in Boyd can be said to have decided the issue presented today. 113
B.

And Then There Were None: Limitation Becomes Elimination

The Boyd rule had survived the rejection of the mere evidence
rule only because the Supreme Court still shared the Boyd Court's
common-sense judgment that forcing a person to utter incriminating
words and extorting from him a record of the same words in written
form are analytically indistinguishable: in either case, the State compels that person to "be a witness against himself' within the meaning
of the fifth amendment. By the October Term, 1975, however,
the Burger Court was finally prepared to attack this judgment directly. The fatal blows were delivered in Fisher v. United States114
and Andresen v. Maryland. 115
After interviews by IRS agents concerning possible liability under the federal income tax laws, the taxpayers in Fisher116 obtained
various records from their accountant, which they then gave to their
attorney. The latter refused to comply with an IRS summons to produce certain records on the ground that enforcement would violate
112. For example, a small family partnership. See 411 U.S. at 101.
113. 417 U.S. at 95 n.2.
114. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
115. 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
116. Fisher was consolidated with United States v. Kasmir, No. 74-611. The
facts of the two cases are substantially identical. '1n Fisher, the records related to
the husband's textile waste business, the wife's clothing shop, and their joint tax re-
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both the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the
attorney-client privilege. 117 The Court held that the summons could
be validly enforced. Although Justices Brennan and Marshall justified this result on the ground that the records were not privat~118
the majority arrived at its decision by reconsidering the nature of
the fifth amendment.
The opinion of the Court, delivered by Justice White, began by
formally recognizing the death of the doctrine. of the "intimate relation" between the fourth and fifth amendments. The majority regarded these as two distinct and only incidentally related reservoirs of
rights, the former being concerned with privacy interests and the latter
with "the extortion of information from the accused." 119 Then, on the
authority of Couch, the Court held that the subpoena did not violate
the taxpayers' fifth amendment. privilege, since it did not require
them to produce the documents themselves. 120 However, the Court
recognized that where, as here, documents had been transferred to
the attorney for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, this privilege
could be invoked indirectly through the attorney-client privilege.
This justification for resisting the subpoena was deemed applicable
only where the taxpayers could have successfully invoked the fifth
amendment privilege had they retained possession of the documents.
Thus, the crucial question was whether the taxpayers themselves
could have resisted a summons to produce the documents.
At the outset, Justice White recognized that ever since Boyd the
accepted doctrine had been that the fifth amendment prohibits the
enforcement of a documentary subpoena against a person who would.
be incriminated by the contents of the documents. But he claimed
that Warden v. Hayden had so undermined the basis of this doctrine
that it now had to be reexamined. 121 Analyzing the fifth amendturn. In Kasmir, they pertained to the taxpayer's medical practice and his personal
tax return. 425 U.S. at 394 nn.2 & 3. In both cases, the subpoenaed records were
the accountants' work products.
117. Although the taxpayers and attorneys in Fisher and Kasmir had claimed in
lower court proceedings that their fourth amendment rights had been violated, they
did not press these claims before the Supreme Court. The Court stated that fourth
amendment arguments, even if raised, would have been unsuccessful: ''The summonses are narrowly drawn and seek only documents of unquestionable relevance to
the tax investigation. Special problems of privacy which might be presented by subpoena of a personal diary ..• are not involved here." 425 U.S. at 40 n.7.
118. See note 122 infra.
119. 425 U.S. at 398 (quoting with approval Couch v. United States, 409 U.S.
322,328 (1973)) (emphasis added).
120. The Court found that the taxpayers in Fisher were not in one of those situations described in Couch "where constructive possession is so clear or relinquishment
of possession so temporary and insignificant as to leave the personal compulsion upon
the taxpayer substantially intact." Fisher, 425 U.S. at 398. See text at note 105
supra.
121. Justice White failed to recognize that two distinct grounds supported the de-
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ment issue formalistically, he pointed out that the statements made
in the documents were not compelled, because the taxpayers had
not been under compulsion at the time they made the statements.
Thus, the subpoenas would compel the taxpayers to commit only one
act-producing the papers. He concluded that the privilege against
self-incrimination is violated only when the compelled act itself constitutes an incriminating communication, thus rejecting the traditional view that the incriminating character of a document's content
is the primary factor in determining whether the privilege is violated
by a documentary subpoena. Because the government already knew
that these records existed and were in the taxpayers' hands, Justice
White ruled that the implied admission of these facts inherent in
the act of producing the documents would not be "testimonial" or
"communicative" in the constitutional sense of these terms. Therefore, under Schmerber, enforcement of the subpoenas would not violate the taxpayer's fifth amendment privilege. 122
But even if the summons could be characterized ·as compelling
the production of testimony, Justice White argued that this would
not be incriminating testimony. The only fact to which the taxpayers would be testifying was that they ~egally possessed certain papers;
they would.not be vouching for the truth of the statements contained
in the papers. Thus, the Court concluded that the taxpayers could
not invoke the fifth amendment privilege, either directly through a
fifth amendment challenge or indirectly through the attorney-client
privilege.
cision in Boyd that the admission of the invoice violated the fifth amendment. One
ground was that the invoice had been obtained in violation of the unreasonable search
· clause of the fourth amendment. The other ground was that, by giving the Boyds
a choice between complying with the notice to produce the invoice and forfeiting the
glass, the government had in fact compelled them to be witnesses against themselves.
Hayden could not have directly affected the latter ratio decidendi. But Justice White
proceeded as if the former had been the sole basis for the Boyd decision. See 425
U.S. at 408-09.
122. This position is untenable for two reasons. First, although the Court purported to find some support for this approach in the cases sustaining the compulsory
production of voice and handwriting exemplars and subpoenas of organizational records, see 425 U.S. at 408, those cases are in fact inapposite. The Court had approved
of subpoenas of organizational records on the ground that neither organizations nor
their agents were entitled to the benefits of the privilege against self-incrimination,
and it had approved of the compulsory production of exemplars on the ground that
their contents were not testimonial at all. Second, insofar as it was suggesting that
the government's prior knowledge that a document existed and was possessed by a
certain individual was relevant to the question of whether its production was "testimonial," the Court was interpreting the protection afforded by the fifth amendment
as "tum[ing] on the strength of the government's case against him." 425 U.S. at 429
(Brennan, J., dissenting). The bizarre nature of this reading of the amendment becomes clearer if it is applied in the context of compelling oral testimony from the
defendant during a criminal trial. Surely no one would seriously suggest that a defendant could be compelled to testify orally against himself in court because he had
not kept sufficiently silent out of court.
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The Court in Fisher cited Berger and Katz, which had involved
only fourth amendment claims, in support of the proposition that the
use of an accused's written or oral communications as evidence
against him may be constitutionally valid so long as their writing or
utterance was not compelled. 123 Thus, it came as no surprise when
the Court applied the Fisher reasoning to a traditional search and
seizure in Andresen v. Maryland. 124
State government agents investigating Andresen for fraud125 had
searched his office and seized various documents that were later introduced into evidence against him. Since the search and seizure
had been conducted pursuant to a warrant, Andresen's fifth amendment claim presented the Court with the question left open in Warden v. Hayden: "[W]hether there are items of evidential value
whose very nature precludes them from being the object of a reasonable search and seizure."126 Recognizing that Boyd had answered
this question in the affirmative, the Court, through Justice Blackmun, read that case as one in which "the legal predicate of the inadmissibility of the evidence seized was a violation of the Fourth
Amendment; the unlawfulness of the search and seizure was thought
to supply the compulsion of the accused necessary to invoke the Fifth
Amendment." 127 Because there was no fourth amendment violation
in the instant case, it was distinguishable from Boyd. 128 Furthermore, on the basis of Fisher, the requisite compulsion was absent
from the search and seizure: the government agents had seized the
documents from Andresen, who had not been compelled to act. 129
123. 425 U.S. at 407-08. Although the majority purported not to be considering
personal records like diaries, 425 U.S. at 401 n.7, the rationale of the opinion is
equally applicable to them. See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual R(ghts, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 497 (1977); Note, Formalism, Legal
Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARV. L. REv. 945, 978 (1977). But see United States v. Beattie, 541
F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 1976). Cf. In re Bernstein, 425 F. Supp. 37 (S.D. Fla. 1977)
(quashing subpoena for incriminating tape recordings in possession of witness).
124. 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
125. Andresen, an attorney, was charged with multiple counts of"fraud and of
fraudulent misappropriation by a fiduciary, 427 U.S. at 467.
126. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 303 (1967).
127. 427 U.S. at 472.
128. Andresen had alleged that the seizures violated his rights under the fourth
amendment because they exceeded the scope of the warrants, see 427 U.S. at 482,
and because the warrants were so broad as to constitute invalid "general warrants,"
427 U.S. at 478-80. The trial court, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, and
the United States Supreme Court all rejected these claims.
129. The Court said: "Indeed, he [Andresen] was never required to say or to
do anything under penalty of sanction." 427 U.S. at 476. Since Andresen would
have been penalized if he had prevented the agents from conducting _the search and
seizure, a more accurate description of the events might be that Andresen was compelled to do nothing. But the Court was not prepared to regard this as compelled
communication. Therefore, under the theory of "compulsion" advanced in Fisher,
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Justice Blackmun was able to arrive at this result only by misinterpreting the Boyd Court's conception of the "intimate relation." 130
Far from holding that a fourth amendment violation was a legal
predicate for the inadmissibility of the evidence, the Boyd Court
had held that, given its understanding of the two amendments, a violation of the fourth was, by definition, a violation of the fifth. Because Justice Blackmun misinterpreted Boyd as he did and because
he found that there was no fourth amendment violation in the instant
case, he was spared the odious task of overruling Boyd. 131 Since
only meager precedential support existed for his position,182 he was
ultimately obliged to defend the decision on the pragmatic ground
that a contrary holding would unduly hamper the State's ability to
combat crime effectively.
Although the Court had announced that it would answer the
question left open in Hayden, 188 it did so by implication only. The
it seems unlikely that the Court would have found a fifth amendment violation even
if it had found that the warrant clause of the fourth amendment had been violated.
Moreover, if the reasoning in Justice Black's concurring opinion in Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 661 (1961)-that the exclusionary rule is of constitutional dimensions
because the use of evidence seized unconstitutionally from a criminal defendant violates his privilege against self-incrimination in that it renders him an involuntary witness against himself-is sound, Andresen may well herald the end of the constitutional dimension of the exclusionary rule. This development would certainly please
the proponents of "law and order" on the Court. But cf. Israel, Criminal Procedure,
the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 15 MICH. L. REV. 1319, 140216 (1977) (suggesting that the Burger Court is not likely to undermine the fundamental protections afforded by Mapp).
130. Justice Blackmun's distortion of Boyd is manifested by his characterization
of its holding that seizures of documents for evidentiary use were per se repugnant
to the privilege against self-incrimination as "dictum." 427 U.S. at 471. Although
the order contested in that case might be more accurately have been analogized to
a subpoena, the Boyd Court intentionally decided the case on the basis of its categorization of the proceedings as a court-ordered "seizure" of the invoice. See text
at note 9 supra.
131. Justice Blackmun also failed to mention the fact that Andresen in effect
overruled the decision in Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), which arguably still had vitality, even after Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), insofar
as it could be said to have involved testimonial evidence.
132. Justice Blackmun cited Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 142 (1927), Abel
v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960), and Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293
(1966), as authority for his holding that a person's private papers can be seized. See
427 U.S. at 474-75. But the support that these decisions offer is questionable. The
Marron and Abel decisions, products of the mere evidence rule, were predicated on
the assumption that, since the documents seized were instrumentalities by which a
crime was being committed (records of an illegal liquor business in Marron, false
identity papers and a coded message in the espionage case of Abel), they were not
the parties' private papers. In Hoffa, the Court held that there was no violation of
Hoffa's fifth amendment privilege because the defendant had freely given the information to a police agent; Andresen, of course, did not consent to the search for and
seizure of his documents.
133. Andresen, 427 U.S. at 471. See also United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435,
441 n.3 (1976).
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sole suggestion in Justice Blackmun's opinion that any category of
communication might be inherently unseizable is found in his discussion of Hoffa v. United States. 134 There the Court implied that
any evidence, so long as it is not a coerced confession,135 may be
seized if the proper procedural safeguards are followed.
Thus, in light of Andresen and Fisher, Boyd is dead. No zone
of privacy now exists that the government cannot enter to take an
individual's property for the purpose of obtaining incriminating information.136 In most cases, the zone can be entered by the issuance
of a subpoena; in the rest, it can be breached by a search warrant.

VI.

A

POSTMORTEM

The words of the Constitution can legitimately be understood in
many ways. Precedent and history can be used to support divergent
readings. Ultimately, the difference between the various interpretations given to the Constitution can be traced to disagreements on
policy.
So it is with Boyd. 131 That case reflected the belief of a majority
of the Justices then constituting the Supreme Court that the individual's interest in the rights that the privilege against self-incrimination was designed to safeguard was more important than the government's interest in convicting criminals. The Court protected those
rights as completely as possible, though it could have read the Constitution as compelling less. At least seven members of that Court
shared the views expressed in the Boyd opinion:
Though the proceeding in question is divested of many of the
aggravating effects of actual search and seizure, yet, as before said,
it contains their substance and essence, and effects their essential purpose. It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and
least repulsive form, but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices
get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and
slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be
obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the
security of person and property should be liberally construed. A close
and literal construction of them deprives them of half their efficacy,
and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more
134. 385 U.S. 293 (1963). Hoffa is discussed by Justice Blackmun in 427 U.S.

at 475.
135. The Burger Court seems to find no conflict between the coerced confession
rule and the required records doctrine, see text at note. 43 supra, of which it approves.
See California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
136. The question of whether this result is consistent with the premises basic to
cases such as Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 779 (1965), both of which establish narrow zones of privacy, is beyond the
scope of this Note.
137. See generally Note, supra note 123.
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in sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful
for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and guard against any
stealthy encroachments thereon. Their motto should be obsta principiis.ias
The Burger Court has rejected Boyd because it no longer considers those values to be paramount; it is more impressed by the government's interest in combatting crime. In Couch, Justice Powell captured the spirit of the current Court:
It is important, in applying constitutional principles, to interpret them
in light of the fundamental interests of personal liberty they were
meant to serve. Respect for these principles is eroded when they
leap their proper bounds to interfere with the legitimate interest of
society in -enforcement of its laws and collection of the revenues. 130 ·
Accordingly, Boyd is dead. But the Court refuses to take the
final step of overruling it.
Justice Brandeis once called Boyd "a case that will be remembered as long as civil liberty lives in the United States."140 At least
it deserves a decent burial.
138. 116 U.S. at 635.
139. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322,336 (1973).
140. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

